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Abstract 
We study a dominance-solvable 'p-beauty contest' game in which a group of players 
simultaneously choose numbers from a closed interval. The winner is the player whose 
number is the closest to p times the average, where p # 1 .  The numbers players choose can 
be taken as an indication of the number of steps of iterated reasoning about others they 
do. Choices in the first period show that the median number of steps of iterated reasoning 
is either one or two. Repeating the game produces reliable convergence to the unique 
Nash equilibrium. Choices in later periods are consistent with subjects' best-responding 
to previous choices, or iterating one step and best-responding to best responses. (Choices 
are not as consistent with ' learning direction theory' which embodies elements of belief­
free reinforcement models) . Variation in the values of p, the number of players, and 
whether subjects played a similar game before, all affect choices and learning. 
Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best-Response 
in Experimental 'P-Beauty Contests'* 
Teck Hua Ho Keith Weigelt Colin Camerer 
1 Introduction
Picture a thin country 1000 miles long, running north and south, like Chile. Several 
natural attractions are located at the northern tip of the country. Suppose each of n 
resort developers plan to locate a resort somewhere on the country's coast (and all spots
are equally attractive) . After all the resort locations are chosen, an airport will be built
to serve tourists, at the average of all the locations and the natural attractions. Suppose 
most tourists visit all the resorts equally often, except for lazy tourists who visit only 
the resort closest to the airport; so the developer who locates closest to the airport gets 
a fixed bonus of extra visitors. 
Where should the developer locate to be nearest to the airport? 
The surprising game-theoretic answer is that all the developers should locate exactly 
where the natural attractions are. This answer requires at least one natural attraction 
at the northern tip, but does not depend on the fraction of lazy tourists or the number 
of developers (as long as there is more than one) .1 
To see how this result comes about, denote developers' choices by mileage numbers 
on the coastline (from 0 to 1000) as xi, x2, • • .  , Xn. Locate all m of the natural attractions
at 0 Then the average location is A = x1 +x2+ ... +xn = _n_ · x .  If we define the fraction· ' n+m n+m 
n�m as p (and note that p < 1 as long as m 2: 1 ) ,  then the developer who is closest toA, or p · x, wins a fixed amount of extra business (from the lazy tourists) . 
*Teck Ho and Qolin Camerer were sponsored in part by National Science Foundation Grant SBR
95-11137 and Keith Weigelt by Wharton's Reginald Jones Center for Policy, Strategy, and Organization. 
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1Douglas Gale ( 1996, section 4) describes a related class of "dynamic coordination" games in which 
the returns to investing at time t can depend on how much others invest after t. For example, a
firm pioneering a new product standard benefits by subsequent entrants using the same standard. In 
equilibrium, all firms invest immediately. 
This game was first discussed by Herve Moulin (1986, p. 72) and studied experi­
mentally by Rosemarie Nagel (1995) . The game can be solved by iterated application of 
dominance. The largest possible value of A is 1000 · p so any choice of x above 1000 . p is 
dominated by choosing 1000 · p. If developers believe others obey dominance, and there­
fore choose Xi < 1000 · p, then the maximum A is 1000 · p2 so any choice larger than that is 
dominated. Iterated application of dominance yields the unique Nash equilibrium, which 
is for everyone to locate at zero. No matter where the average of the other developers' 
locations is, a developer wants to locate between that average and the natural attractions 
(which is where the airport will be built) ; this desire draws all the developers inexorably 
toward exactly where the attractions are. 
We call these 'p-beauty contest' games2 because they capture the importance of iter­
ated reasoning John Maynard Keynes described in his famous analogy for stock market 
investment (as Nagel, 1995, pointed out) . Keynes (1936, pp. 155-156) said 
. .. professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions 
in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hun­
dred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice 
most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a 
whole . . . .  It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one's judg­
ment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely 
thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our 
intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion 
to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher 
degrees. 
In Keynes's 'newspaper competition' people want to choose exactly the same faces 
others choose. Professional investment is not quite like this. Think of the time at which 
investors choose to sell a rising stock as picking a number. When many investors choose 
to sell, the stock crashes; the time of the crash is around the average number (selling 
time) chosen. Then professional investment is a p-beauty contest (with p < 1 ) in which 
investors want to sell a few days ahead of the crash-picking a number equal to p times 
the average number-but not too far ahead. 
Our paper reports experiments on p-beauty contest games. These games are ideal for 
studying an important question in game theory-how many iterations of dominance to 
players apply? The games are also useful for studying learning. Both iterated dominance 
and learning have broad implications for economics. 
Our central contribution is application to p-beauty contests of a pair of structural 
models-a model of first-period choices, and a separate model of learning-similar to 
those used recently by Dale Stahl and Paul Wilson (1994, 1995) , Debra Holt (1993) , and 
2The term 'guessing game' has some precedence (it is used in two published papers) but does not 
distinguish these games from most others. We introduce the name 'p-beauty contest' because the name 
is apt and the Keynesian passage is well-known. 
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others. In the model of first-period choices, players are assumed to obey different levels 
of iterated dominance. We estimate from the data what the distribution of the different 
levels is most likely to be. In the learning model, players are assumed to use different 
levels of iterated best response. These models give a parsimonious way to empirically 
characterize the levels of iterated dominance and iterated best-response. 
1.1 Iterated dominance 
Iterated dominance is perhaps the most basic principle in game theory. Games in which 
iterated application of dominance determine a unique equilibrium are called 'dominance­
solvable' .  Some games in this class include finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma, 'cen­
tipede' (e.g. , Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey, 1992) , the 'electronic mail game' 
(Ariel Rubinstein, 1988) , Cournot duopoly, and others. 
In a dominance-solvable game, reaching the equilibrium requires some minimal num­
ber of steps of iterated dominance (which we call the rationality-threshold) . There are 
good reasons to doubt that players behave as if they have more than a couple of steps 
of iterated rationality. For example, iterated reasoning is cognitively difficult. And high 
levels of iterated rationality are not easily justified by natural selection arguments (see 
Stahl, 1993). 3 
Furthermore, most experimental studies indicated limited application of iterated dom­
inance, perhaps 1-3 steps. The p-beauty contest is a sharper instrument for measuring 
iterated dominance than other games, however, because it is a constant-sum game so 
apparent violations of dominance due to altruism, cooperativeness, etc. , are less likely. 
The level at which iterated dominance is violated is central for two questions in eco­
nomics. First, many economists (e.g. , Charles Plott, 1992) argue that phenomena which 
appear irrational could be due to rational players expecting some others to behave irra­
tionally. Potential examples include cooperation in finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma 
games, the winner's curse, escalating bids in the dollar auction, and price bubbles in ex­
perimental markets (e.g. , David Porter and Vernon Smith, 1995) . The p-beauty contest 
game tests this conjecture directly by measuring the fractions of players who violate dom­
inance, violate one step of iterated dominance, etc. (Some players do violate dominance, 
so the strong form of the conjecture is false.) 
Second, Ho and Weigelt (1996) show that subjects playing coordination games with 
multiple equilibria appear .to. use .. rationality-threshold as a selection principle (they coor-
��������������- -
3Natural selection works if those who are rational do better, and those who are not get eliminated by 
natural selection. However, in games with unique dominance-solvable equilibria the equilibrium strategy 
is only a best response to all other strategies if the rationality-threshold is one (as in one-shot prisoners' 
dilemma.) Therefore, players who choose nonequilibrium strategies, but stay one step ahead of the 
equilibration process, will be selected for and players who immediately choose equilibria will be selected 
against. If there is a steady flow of naive new players, those players who choose equilibria 'too quickly' 
will gradually die out. 
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dinate on lower-threshold equilibria) . The levels of iterated dominance needed to reach 
equilibria could therefore help predict which equilibria will be selected. Equilibrium se­
lection is a long-standing problem in economics because of multiple equilibria in models 
of search and trading, the macroeconomy, intrafirm investment, etc. 
1.2 Learning and iterated best-response 
The predominant view in modern game theory is that equilibria in all but the simplest 
games are reached by a learning or evolutionary process rather than by reasoning. Many 
processes have been studied (e.g. ,  Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, 1991; Alvin Roth 
and Ido Erev, 1995; Kenneth Binmore, John Gale and Larry Samuelson, 1994) but more 
careful empirical observations are needed to judge which rules describe learning best. 
While P-beauty contests are uniquely suited to studying iterated dominance, they 
are also a useful tool for studying learning empirically for three reasons. First, even if 
players do not choose the Nash equilibrium initially, choices are likely to move toward 
that point. Precisely because convergence is not immediate, there is healthy variation 
in the data which we can use to estimate which adaptive dynamics fit the convergence 
process best. Second, because of the structure of the game, adaptive learners, who simply 
learn from past observations, choose different numbers than sophisticated learners who 
realize others are adapting and then best-respond to them. The difference in choices 
by adaptive and sophisticated types can be used to estimate the proportions of those 
types in the subject population. Third, since choices are steadily converging toward a 
prediction at the boundary of the strategy space (either 0 or 200) , approaches which 
assume players just repeat previously-successful strategies are likely to lag behind the 
subjects' actual learning. So these games are good for pitting reinforcement approaches 
against more complex learning rules. (That competition is not conducted here, but see 
Stahl, in press) . 
Our experiments use several variants of the p-beauty contest game. First, we com­
pare 'finite-threshold' games (with p > 1) in which the equilibrium can be reached 
in a finite number of steps of iterated dominance, with 'infinite-threshold' games with 
p < 1 ,  in which the equilibrium can not quite be reached in finitely-many iterations of 
dominance. (The developer-location game mentioned in the introduction is an infinite­
threshold game. ) The finite-threshold case is useful because it helps bound the number 
of steps of iterated dominance people use naturally. 
Two other comparisons, between different group sizes n and values of p, are used to 
study whether the number of levels of iterated dominance (and levels of best-responding) 
are robust across parameter variations. Group size is particularly interesting because 
players in smaller groups exert more influence on the mean number; if they recognize 
this, they should choose lower numbers and converge more quickly. 
To study learning, we estimate a structural model in which some fraction of level-
0' players choose a weighted average of previous winning numbers, other players best-
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respond to the winning numbers in the previous periods, other players best-respond to 
anticipated best responses, and so on. Versions of some familiar learning rules (e.g . ,  
fictitious play and Cournot best-response dynamics) are nested within this class. We 
also estimate a structural form of the learning direction' theory tested by Nagel (1995) , 
and earlier by Reinhard Selten and Rolf Stoecker (1986) . 
1.3 Key Results 
Our experiments and analysis yield several key results: 
• First-period choices are widely distributed and far from equilibrium, but subsequent 
choices converge to equilibrium (particularly in the finite-threshold game) . 
• First-period choices are consistent with a median of 2 steps of iterated dominance in 
the infinite-threshold game, and 1 step in the finite-threshold game. The estimated 
proportions are spread across levels 0-3 (at least 10% in each). 
• Choices after the first period are consistent with learning rules in which a large 
fraction of level O' subjects choose a weighted average of previous winning numbers 
(weighting the previous winner most strongly) . Half the subjects (level ls) best­
respond to the level O's. 
• Subjects with experience in a previous game generally have higher best-response 
levels. The parameter estimates are also sensitive to both p and the group size. 
2 The p-beauty Contest Game 
In our experiments, a group of n subjects simultaneously choose a number from a closed 
interval [L, H]. The subject whose number is closest to p times the group mean wins 
pi. Denote the winning number by w = p · x = p · xi+x2�···+xn. Subjects' payoffs are 
determined as follows. Denote the set of winners J* to be argmini{lxi - w j} (the set of 
players whose choices are closest to w) . Each winner i E J* obtains a monetary prize of 
�:i and the remaining group members receive nothing. Variants of this game are denoted 
by G( [L, H], p, n). 
Consider two variants of this game with n players: 1 )  finite threshold FT(p, n) = 
G([lOO, 200], p, n) and -2)ihfinite threshold, IT(p, n) = G([O, 100],p, n) . While both 
games have an unique dominance solvable equilibrium, IT(p, n) requires an infinite level 
of iterated reasoning to solve the game whereas FT(p, n) requires only a finite level. 
Figures la-b illustrate this with FT(l.3, n) and JT(0.7, n). In these figures, the level 
of iterated rationality is indicated by R(i) .  For example, R(2) means that subjects are 
rational and know that others are rational. Figure la shows that the threshold level 
needed to solve FT(l.3, n) is 3. Subjects with zero levels of iterated rationality may 
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choose numbers from [100, 130) (i .e. , R(0)4) . Rational players will choose a number from 
[130, 200] because 130 dominates any number in [100, 130)(i.e. , R(l) ) .  (This illustration 
assumes a very large number of players, so that players can ignore their own effect on the 
mean and winning number) . Mutually rational players deduce it is in their interests to 
choose a number from [169, 200] (i.e., R(2) ) .  To guarantee all subjects choose the unique 
equilibrium of 200 requires a threshold level of 3 (since a subject at R(2) could choose 
less than 200) . When p = 1.1 ,  the threshold level is 8 .  
In Figure lb, the threshold level for the IT(0.7, n) game is infinite. Rational players 
will only choose a number from [O, 70] because any number in (70, 100] is dominated by 
70 (i .e. , R(l) ) .  Applying the same reasoning, mutually rational R(2) players will only 
choose a number from [O, 49] (i.e . ,  0.7 · 70) . With k-levels of iterated rationality, players 
will pick numbers from [O, 0 .7k+l · 100] . All players will choose the unique equilibrium of 
0 only if iterated rationality is infinite (i.e. , 0. 7k -t 0 as k -t oo ) .  
3 Experimental Design 
To investigate the degree of iterated rationality required to each equilibrium we studied 
games with infinite (IT) and finite (FT) thresholds, and different values of p. The design 
also varied the group size n, to test whether smaller or larger groups behave differently. In 
addition, to study whether learning transfers across different games, each subject played 
one IT game and one FT game (counterbalanced for order) . Experiments were conducted 
using the following game pairs. 
IT(0.7, 3) , FT(l.3, 3) 
IT(0.9,  3) , FT(l.1 , 3) 
IT(0.7, 7) , FT(l.3, 7) 
IT(0.9, 7) , FT(l.1 , 7) 
Each game pair consists of one FT and one IT game. Groups of 3 were randomly 
assigned to one of the first two pairs and groups of 7 to one of the last two pairs. To 
maintain a constant expected payoff per subject across groups of different sizes, the payoff 
for winning was directly proportional to the group size. The expected payoff per subject 
per round was $0. 50 .5 
4Irrational players may also choose a number outside of (100, 130) by chance, thus the number of 
players choosing between (100,130) is a lower bound on the number of R(O) players. 
5The standard deviations of payoffs are 3.22 for IT(p,7), 2.48 for FT(p,7), 2. 12 for IT(p,3), and 1.95 
for FT(p,3). If subjects are equally-skilled, the theoretical standard deviations are 3.89 (n = 7) and 2 .24 
(n = 3). Note that there is less variation in actual payoffs than predicted by the equal-skill benchmark. 
Most of the difference is due to the fact that subjects shared the prize in the event of a tie. Simulating the 
standard deviation of actual payoffs that would result if the whole prize was given to a randomly-chosen 
subject in the event of a tie yields standard deviations are extremely close to equal-skill benchmark. 
Note that this finding casts some doubt on models in which players have persistent differences in skill, 
effort, or reasoning ability, etc. that create payoff differences. Or the standard deviation of payoffs may 
not be sensitive enough to detect individual differences. 
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We ran 55 experimental groups with a total of 277 subjects. There were 27 groups of 
size 3, and 28 groups of size 7. Table 1 summarizes our experimental design.6 
Subjects were recruited from a business quantitative methods class at a major un­
dergraduate university in Southeast Asia. They were assigned to experimental sessions 
randomly and each participated in one session. 
A typical session was conducted as follows. Subjects reported to a room with chairs 
placed around its perimeter, facing the wall, so subjects could not see the work of others. 
Subjects were randomly assigned seats, subject numbers, and given written instructions 
(see Appendix) . After all subjects were seated, an administrator read the instructions 
aloud, and subjects were given the opportunity to publicly ask questions. During the 
experiment, subjects were not allowed to communicate with each other. Before round 
1 began, all subjects were publicly informed of the relevant number range [L, H], and 
the value of p. Then round 1 began. Subjects were asked to choose a number from 
the relevant range [L, H], and record this number on a slip of paper. An administrator 
then collected the responses of all subjects, calculated the average number of the group 
and publicly announced this number. Payoffs were then privately announced to each 
subject for that round (the winner(s) received a positive payoff, all others received $0) . 7  
Then the next round began. All rounds were identical, and the game lasted for 10  
rounds8 . After the 10th round was completed, subjects participated in a second 10 round 
game. The order in which the games were played was determined randomly. Subjects 
remained in the same group, but the number range [L, H], and the parameter p were 
both changed. The experimental procedure remained the same. After this second 10  
rounds, subjects summed their earnings over all 20  rounds, and were paid their earnings 
in cash. Experiments lasted approximately 40 minutes, and subjects earned on average 
$10 .00. 
4 Basic Results 
This section summarizes basic results. Later sections report more refined estimates of 
the number of levels of iterated dominance subject use, and estimates of learning models. 
Result 1: First-period choices are far from equilibrium, and roughly normally distributed 
6Raw data are available from the authors. 
7 A referee wondered whether announcing who won each round might be a poor design choice in this 
game( though announcing payoffs regularly is the standard protocol in experimental economics). The 
concern is that wealth effects alter incentives and create surprising outlying 'spoiler responses of 100. In 
section 4 we point out that there is no systematic evidence that these spoiler choices came from subjects 
who were satiated in money from winning repeatedly. Furthermore, a good reason for announcing 
payoffs is that payoff history is necessary to provide reinforcement and allow tests of reinforcement 
learning models. 
8Each subject played the game with the same group members for all 10 rounds. Since the game was 
constant-sum, there was no reason for subjects to develop reputation or tacitly collude to increase overall 
payoffs. 
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around the interval midpoint. Choices converge toward equilibrium over time. 
Figures 2a-h (IT) and 3a-h(FT) show histograms of the frequencies of choices by 
subjects in each condition. Only 2.2% of the subjects chose the equilibrium in the 
first period. Most first-period distributions are sprinkled around the interval midpoint. 
Choices converge toward the equilibrium in later periods. 
Table 2 summarizes the degrees of iterated dominance suggested by number choices. 
The table has four panels, one for each value of p, adding 3- and 7-person groups and 
experience levels together for each p. Each row reports the number of choices violating 
each level of iterated dominance (in conjunction with lower levels) . The last row of each 
panel reports the number of players who chose the unique equilibrium prediction. 9 For 
example, in condition FT(l.3, n) in round 1 ,  35 subjects out of 140 (25%) exhibited zero 
levels of iterated dominance because they chose numbers in the interval [100, 130) , 68 
subjects ( 48.6%) exhibited only one level of iterated dominance, and so forth. 
, 
Table 2 shows that substantial numbers of subjects violate each of the lowest levels 
of iterated dominance (and consequently, very few choose the equilibrium) , particularly 
in earlier rounds. (Later rounds are consistent with higher levels of iterated dominance, 
but that is probably learning rather than more sophisticated iterated reasoning per se.) 
Section 5 below gives more precise estimates. 
Result 2: Choices are closer to equilibrium for games with finite-thresholds, and for games 
with p further from 1. 
Comparing the Figure 2 and 3 histograms shows that choices are closer to equilibrium 
across most rounds in the finite-threshold games, compared to infinite-threshold games. 
For example, look at Figures 2a and 3a: Starting from the second round the proportion 
of equilibrium choices in the FT game (Figure 3a) begins to grow toward 100%, while 
convergence is much slower in the IT game (Figure 2a) .10 Pooling rounds, the frequencies 
of equilibrium play are highly significantly different in FT and IT games (51 .6% vs. 4 .9%, 
(x2 = 1493, p < 0 .001) . 
In addition, more choices are at equilibrium in games with p further from zero (p = 1 .3 
vs. p = 1 . 1 ,  x2 = 171 .6 , p < 0.001); and p = 0.7 vs. p = 0.9(x2 = 5.9,p < 0 .05). 11 
Analyses-of-variance (ANOVA) using each group's mean choice for the first or last five 
rounds also shows a strong effect of p, at significance levels from .000 to .08, for each 
of the two groups of rounds (1-5 or 6-10) and threshold levels. For example, means for 
p = .7 are lower than means for p = .9 for the first five rounds (31 . 57 vs. 44.66) and the 
last five rounds�F7".�76 vs. 27.83) . 
9Levels of rationality higher than the threshold are indistinguishable, and pooled in 'Equilibrium 
Play'. 
10Note that the tall bars in the back corner of Figures 2 represent frequent choices of 1-10, not zero. 
11 While the threshold levels for both games are infinite, the level of iterated rationality needed for any 
number in the closed interval is higher when p = 0.9. For instance, to reach 10, IT(n) requires a level 
of iterated rationality of 6 where IT'(n) requires a level of 21 .  This implies that threshold convergence 
is faster for IT relative to IT'. 
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Result 3: Choices are closer to equilibrium for large (7-person) groups than for small 
(3-person) groups. 
Figures 2a and 2e illustrate the typical effect of group size: Larger groups (Figure 
2a) choose higher numb�rs at the start, and converge to equilibrium much more quickly 
than the small groups (Figure 3a) . 
Across rounds, the proportions of equilibrium play by subjects in 3- and 7- per­
son groups are significantly different in finite-threshold games (39.6% vs. 56.6%, x2 = 
67.3, p < 0.001) and marginally significant in infinite-threshold games (3.7% vs. 5.4%, 
x2 = 3.4, p < 0. 10) .  Means of larger groups also start closer to the equilibrium for the 
FT games and, for both kinds of games, lie closer to the equilibrium in every round. 
ANOVAs on group means aggregated over rounds 1-5 or 6-10 show highly significant 
differences across group sizes in comparisons for all values of p and experience levels 
(p-values range from .003 to .014) . 
The group size effect goes in a surprising direction because each member of a small 
group has a larger influence on the mean and should choose closer to equilibrium if they 
take account of this. For example, if p = . 7 and you think others will choose an average 
of 50, you should choose the solution to C = . 7 · c+(n;12·50, which is 30.4 if n = 3 and 
33.3 if n = 7. But large groups choose lower numbers. Perhaps, as a referee suggested, 
adjusting for n takes extra thought which limits the number of steps of iterated reasoning 
subjects do. This represents an interesting puzzle for future research. 
Result 4: Choices by experienced subjects are no different than choices by inexperienced 
subjects in the first round, but converge faster to equilibrium. 
Figures la-b illustrate the effects of experience in IT games. Experienced subjects 
(who previously played an FT game with an equilibrium of 200) choose similar numbers 
to inexperienced subjects in the first round, but converge much faster. 
Two types of learning transfer by experienced subjects can be distinguished: 'Imme­
diate transfer' (if choices are closer to equilibrium in the first round) , and 'structural 
transfer' if convergence is faster across the ten rounds.12 
In general, there is little immediate transfer because experienced subjects' choices in 
the first round are not much different than the choices of inexperienced subjects. 13 But 
there is some evidence of structural transfer because ANOVAs show that group means 
of experienced subjects are closer to equilibrium in the first 5 rounds (F = 4.60 , p < .04) 
12Without detailed cognitive theory, there are no firm ground on which to make sharper predictions. 
We note that psychological literature on transfer is generally pessimistic about transfer of 'deep structure 
of similar problems (e.g . ,  Mark Singley and John Anderson, 1989) . However, this result and further 
analyses reported in section 6 show that subjects do converge more quickly with experience, hinting at 
some deep structure learning. 
13The only exception is the p = .7 case where experienced subjects are further from equilibrium, 
exhibiting 'negative transfer'. For p = .7, t = -2.14,p < 0.01 for n = 7 and t = -2.15,p < 0.01 for 
n =3. 
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and about the same in the last 5 rounds (F = .07,p < .80) for FT games, and closer to 
equilibrium in IT games (F = 2.62,p < .11 and F = 15.67,p < .001). And overall, the 
proportion of equilibrium play is significantly higher for experienced subjects (x2 = 28.2 
(FT) and x2 = 125.6 (IT) , both p < 0.001) 
Result 5: Extreme choices of 100 ('spoilers') occur occasionally, often after previous 
losses, and are seldom repeated. 
A small, eye-catching feature of the histograms in Figures 2-3 are choices of extreme 
numbers close to 100. We focus on choices of exactly 100. There are 87 such spoiler 
choices (3.1%) in FT games and 52 (1.9%) in IT games. (Nagel, 1995, reports . 9%.) 
Most were chosen by subjects who spoiled only once (88.6%). While spoilers are rare, 
it is natural to wonder what causes them because a choice of 100 is as far from the 
equilibrium as possible. 
There are several plausible explanations. Incentives may change if repeat winners 
become satiated in money (or altruistically want to let others win) , or if previous losers 
become frustrated and express their annoyance by making the wrongest possible choice 
(hence, the term 'spoiler') .  Or subjects may be choosing 100 hoping to win, naively 
thinking they can alter the mean enough to win if they choose the most extreme number. 
Alternatively, they may be trying to strategically manipulate the learning process­
knowing others respond to previous winners, they try to spoil the learning process by 
changing the mean temporarily, so they can win when others overreact to the unusual 
mean.14 
Facts about spoilers help distinguish these explanations. Spoiling choices are evenly 
distributed across rounds and are equally common in the last round (casting doubt on 
the learning-manipulation theory) . 15 Spoilers tended to follow low-payoff rounds, and did 
not raise average payoffs. 16 These facts reject the altruism explanation, which incorrectly 
predicts spoiling in later rounds and following high payoffs. The facts are consistent with 
frustration, since spoiling tends to follow low payoffs, and naive attempts to win by 
raising the mean, which generally fail and are quickly abandoned. 
In the analyses below, we both include and exclude spoilers. (An alternative is to 
estimate the proportion of these 'level -1' types as Stahl, in press, did. ) Some param­
eter estimates are affected, but the basic conclusions are unchanged when spoilers are 
excluded. 
14In John Duffy and Nagel, 1996, and in further experiments of ours, we set the winning number top 
times the median, which is less easily influenced by spoilers than the mean. There are fewer spoilers in 
these experiments, consistent with the naive and strategic�manipulation explanations. 
1566 spoilers occur in rounds 1-5, 73 in round 6-10, and 16 in the last round. The average round 
numbers in which spoiling first occurs are 6.11 and 4.78 for IT and FT games, which are only slightly 
different from the average round number of 5.5 (t=l .31 and -2.23) . 
16The average per-round earnings in pre-spoiling rounds were $.37 and $.47 in IT and FT games, 
marginally below the expected earnings of $.50 (t=-2.43, -1.31) . Post-spoiling earnings averaged $ .29 
and $ .45, substantially less than expected profits (t=-4.20, -1.51) but not significantly different than 
pre-spoiling profits (t=-1.05,.36) . 
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5 Further Results: Levels of Iterated Dominance 
The simplest method for approximating the level of iterated dominance revealed by 
choices is to count the number of choices in each of the intervals [O, pk+1 . 100] (or the 
corresponding intervals when p > 1). (These figures were reported above in Table 2.) 
For example, since 6.6% of the subjects chose numbers in (90, 100] in IT(0.9, n) game, 
then we can conclude that at least 6.6% violated dominance. Since 5.1% of the subjects 
chose numbers in (81, 90}, we can conclude that at least 5.1% of"the subjects violate the 
conjunction of dominance, and one level of iterated dominance. (Or put differently, we 
can be sure these subjects are not performing two or more levels of iterated dominance. ) 
But these numbers are simply a lower bound on the rates at which various levels of 
rationality are violated. The bounds cannot be tightened without using some method for 
distinguishing how many of the 5.1% subjects in the interval (81, 90], for example, are 
violating dominance and how many are obeying dominance but violating one step iterated 
dominance. If these subjects could be assigned to one level or the other, the estimates of 
levels of iterated dominance revealed by choices can be sharpened considerably. 
The method we use posits a simple structural model of how dominance-violating 'level 
O' players choose, assume that 'level 1' players obey dominance but believe that others 
are level 0 players, etc. (as in Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995). 
We begin with the assumption that level 0 players choose numbers randomly from a 
truncated normal density with mean µ and variance a2 . 17 Level L players are assumed 
to believe that all other players (besides themselves) choose from the level L - 1 distri­
bution BL_1(x). Believing this, they mentally simulate n -1 draws from the level L - 1 
distribution and compute the average of those draws. (For reasons we explain below, 
assume they allow these draws to be correlated with correlation p.) Then they choose p 
times the average (including their own choice) , giving a distribution that satisfies 
(1) 
where Bi_1 is the k-th draw from random variable BL-l· This gives a random variable 
for level L players' choice 
p n BL= -- . 2:B1-1 n - P k=2 (2) 
17We also tried a uniform distribution over all possible number choices, but the uniform almost always 
fit worse than the normal. Also, the normal distributions always have some mass m at numbers outside 
the permissible interval. We truncate the distribution at the endpoints and assume that all mass outside 
the endpoints is piled up at the nearest endpoint. An alternative technique is to normalize the distri­
bution within the endpoints, dividing the distribution by 1-m. The latter technique did not produce 
reliable maximum-likelihood estimates in many cases, especially for p > 1 .  
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Notice that since the level 0 distribution is truncated at 100 (for the p < 1 case) , the 
level 1 distribution is automatically truncated at [P·��l) · 100]; so level 1 players never 
violate dominance. Similarly, since the level 2 distribution is truncated at [P·(n-l)J2. 100 n-p ' 
level 2 types never violate dominance and never violate one step of iterated dominance. 18 
It is easy to show that the mean and variance of BL obey the following recursive 
relationships: 
p . (n - l) 
· E(BL-1), n - p 
p2 ( n - 1) · ( n - 2) 
( )2 
• [(n - 1) + 2p · J · Var(BL-1). n - p 2 
(3) 
(4) 
An important feature of this model is that if p < 1, as the level L rises, the variance in 
the distribution of choices BL falls19 (because the term (n�:)2 • ((n- 1) + 2p · (
n-l)�(n-2)] is 
less than one) . The variance falls because the players are assumed to take an average of 
n - 1 other players' choices, which will have less variance than an individual choice. This 
implies that the level 1 players' distribution will be rather narrow, the level 2 players' 
distribution narrower still, and so forth. Allowing higher-level players to perceive a 
nonzero correlation among (simulated) choices by lower-level players p slows down the 
rate of reduction in Var(BL) with L, and turns out to fit the data much better than the 
restriction p = 0 .  
The assumptions above give a distribution of first-period choices by each of the level 
types. The crucial problem is how to 'assign' a level type to players who choose numbers 
Xi that different types might choose. Take the p = . 7 case as a clarifying example. 
Suppose a player chooses 63. This choice could come from a level 0 player or from a level 
1 player. We assign this choice to a level 0 type iff a level 0 type is more likely to have 
made that choice than a level 1 type (i.e, iff B0(63) > B1(63)) .  (Note that a level 2 type 
would never pick 63, i .e. , B2(63) = 0, and similarly for higher-level types. )  
Put more formally, assume that a fraction wL of the players are of level L ,  and wi is 
the fraction of choices assigned to L in each level-of-dominance interval or 'bin' b. The 
180ne criticism of this method is that it assumes all players think they are 'smarter (or reason more 
deeply) than others. While this is logically impossible, it is consistent with a large body of psychological 
evidence showing-widespread overconfidence ab.out relative ability (see, e.g., Dan Lovallo and Camerer, 
1996). An alternative approach includes some degree of 'self-consciousness': Level L types to believe 
that a fraction WL of others are level L types like themselves, then perhaps impose (or test) the rational 
expectations assumption that the perceived WL is close to the econometrician's best estimate, given the 
data (as in McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1996). The empirical problem 
with self-consciousness in p-beauty contests is that players who think enough others are like themselves 
are inexorably led toward the Nash equilibrium; but choices are very far from the equilibrium. 
19In general, the same thing can be said for the case if p > 1 as long as p is small. However, if p is 
close to 1, then we can have Var(BL) > Var(BL-i). 
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total proportion of level L types is WL = L::f;i0 N�t (where Lm is the maximum level 
estimated (3 in our analyses)and Nb is the number of observations in bin b). Define the 
observations x in bin b by those x which satisfy [P(n-l)]b+l . 100 < x < [P(n-l)]b . 100. n-p - n-p (There are a total of Lm + 1 bins) . For observations in bin b, the distribution function is 
b 
B(x) = L, wt · BL(x) (5) 
L=O 
Of course, 'Lf:o WL = 1 .  Then the log-likelihood of observing a sample (xi, i = 1 ,  . . .  , N) 
is: 
N 
LL1(µi, lT1, p, wi;  b = 0, Lm; L = O, . . .  , Lm) = L Log(B(xi)). (6) 
i=l 
The objective is to maximize the log-likelihood LL1 by choosing µi, lT1, p, wi; b = 0, Lm, L = 
O, . . .  ,Lm. 
The left columns of Table 3 report maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for IT 
and FT games, using only first round data. Separate analyses include and exclude 
'spoiler' choices of 100. 
In both games the estimates of Wi show substantial proportions, at least 12%, in all 
level categories from 0 to 3 .  (Higher-level types are included in level 3) .  The median 
level is two for IT games and one for FT games. The IT games also have a larger fraction 
of high-level types than FT games. 
The estimated means of the normal distribution from which level Os choose-70 for IT 
and 1 16  for FT games-are far from the interval midpoint and from equilibrium, but this 
is plausible since only level 0 types choose numbers far from equilibrium so the estimate 
of µ must be far from equilibrium to explain those observed choices. The estimated 
correlation p is 1 .00 in both cases. This implies that higher-level subjects are choosing 
much more variable numbers than would be predicted if they were simply best-responding 
to an average of independent choices by others. Their behavior is consistent with players 
choosing against a 'representative-agent player' or composite, neglecting variation in the 
sample mean. 20 
20The correlation p might be a game-theoretic incarnation of the 'representativeness' heuristic in 
statistical judgment (see, for example, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 1982) . People using rep­
resentativeness judge likelihoods of samples by how well they represent a population or process. Repre­
sentativeness inadvertently neglects other statistical properties like variation-in this case, higher-level 
players neglect the fact that independent draws tighten the variance of the average they best-respond to. 
A related phenomenon has been observed in experiments on 'weak link' coordination games, in which 
a player's payoff depends upon his action and the minimum action chosen by others. The distributions 
of first-round choices in these games is strikingly similar across groups of different sizes (even though 
the chance of getting a low minimum rises sharply as the group grows) , as if players represent all other 
players as a single composite. 
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The rightmost columns of Table 3 show parameter estimates using Nagel's  ( 1995) 
data with p = 1/2 and p = 2/3. Estimates of normalized level percentages (from her 
Figure 2) are shown in parentheses. Our estimates using her p = 2/3 data suggest more 
level Os and fewer level 3s than in our p < 1 data. 
Our method for estimating the proportions of level types and Nagel's method generally 
give similar results. Her method posits an n-step reasoning process which begins from 
a reference point, 50 for the numbers reported in Table 3. 21 Our method estimates this 
starting point, instead, giving a level 0 distribution mean of fl = 52.2 for p = 2/3 and 
fl= 36.0,  for p = 1/2. She then tests the theory by counting the frequencies of choices 
in number intervals corresponding to various reasoning levels. Our structural method, in 
contrast, uses all the data and assigns each observation to some level of reasoning (based 
on relative likelihood) , giving a more complete picture. For example, her method does 
not classify the 20% of subjects who choose greater than 50 in the first round in the 
p = 2/3 game (normalizing the percentages she reported spreads the 20% evenly over 
level categories) . Our method mostly classifies these 20% as level Os and consequently, 
we estimate a much higher level 0 proportion (28% versus 13%) . 
6 Further Results: Learning Model Estimation 
In this section we estimate two classes of learning models to understand the dynamic 
process by which choices change over rounds. 
6.1 Iterated Best-response Models 
The first class of learning models posits various levels of 'iterated best-response'. This 
model parallels the analysis in the last section of levels of iterated dominance underlying 
first-round choices, but applies the same basic ideas to learning over rounds. 
In the model, level-0 learners simply choose a weighted sum of winning numbers in 
previous rounds. Level-1 learners assume all others are level-0 learners and best-respond 
to anticipated choices by level-0 learners. Level 2 learners best-respond to level 1 learners, 
and so forth. 
These levels capture the distinction between adaptive learning (responding only to 
previous observations) and sophisticated learning (best-responding to anticipated play 
by others) which is discussed, among others, by Milgrom and Roberts (1991).  Level 0 
learners are adaptive; higher levels are sophisticated. 
21 Nagel (1994, pp. 23-24) also reports estimates using a reference point of 100. With that reference 
point, she estimates fewer low-level types and more high-level types, which pushes her estimates even 
further from ours. 
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To express the model formally, denote subjects' choices at round t E {1 , 2, . . .  , 10} by 
X1 (t), x2 (t), . . .  , Xn(t). The winning number at round t, w(t) = p ·x(t) = p ·  xi(t)+x2(t)+ ... +xn(t). . n 
Suppose� subject of level L forms a guess Gt ( t) about what another subject j will choose. 
Given Gl(t), the subject chooses a best response, to maximize his or her expected payoff. 
That is, the subject will choose BL(t) such that 
Or 
BL(t) = p. BL(t) + L,7J=2 G{(t) . 
n 
p n . BL(t) = - · l:Gl(t). n - p i=2 
(7) 
(8) 
The guess of level L subjects at time t is assumed to be the best response of level L- ls 
(hence ther term 'iterated best-response ), i .e. , 
(9) 
The level 0 subject j is assumed22 to choose randomly from a normal density with 
meanµ equal to a weighted sum of the R previous winning numbers (where R corresponds 
to level of recall), and variance <J2• That is, 
R 
µ = L f3s · w(t - s) . 
s=l 
(10) 
The parameters f3s capture the influence of past winning numbers on the current choice. 
In addition, the correlation between subject choices in any level is p (for the same reasons 
given in the previous section). 
Assume that a fraction aL of the players are level L best-responders, and compose a 
mixture of the underlying distributions to form an overall distribution of probability of 
number choices, B. Then B(x) is given by: 
Lm 
B(x) = L aL · BL(x). ( 11 )  
L=O 
where Lm is the highest level allowed (restricted to three in our estimates). 
22In an earlier draft we assumed level 0 types chose a weighted sum of previous winning numbers and 
their own previous choices. However, the coefficients on previous choices were rarely significant so at 
the suggestion of referees those terms were dropped from specification (6.4). Our earlier analysis also 
allowed only level 1 types and referees wisely coaxed us to do this more general analysis. 
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When Lm = 1, level 0 learners choose from a normal distribution with mean given by 
(6.4) above and level 1 learners choose from a normal distribution with mean given by 
P·�7'.:_�1) · [:L�=l f3s · w(t - s)]. This implies that when p is further from 1, and n is small, 
choices will be closer to equilibrium (because the fraction P·��l) is less (greater) than 
one for IT (FT) games). Our experiment was designed to test these predictions. 
In addition, variants of three familiar special cases are nested in the general model. 
These are Cournot dynamics (Augustin Cournot, 1838), a variant of fictitious play 
(George Brown, 1958), and a hybrid case in which previous observations are given geo­
metrically declining weight. 
1 .  Modified Fictitious Play: Fictitious play learning rules assume that the proba­
bility of another player's future choice is best predicted by the empirical frequency 
of that choice in previous plays. Aplausible variant of this applied to the p-beauty 
contest game is that subjects are all level 1 learners who expect all others to choose 
an equally-weighted average of the numbers they chose in the past. Modified fic­
titious play can thus be tested by restricting all types to be level 1 ( a1 = 1), and 
{31 = . . .  = f3R = {3. (A further restriction is f3 = 1/ R but, as we shall see, that is 
strongly rejected.) 
2. Geometric Weighted Average: Fictitious play weights all previous observations 
equally. A more plausible model assigns geometrically decreasing weights to older 
observations, then averages them. The declining weight model will fit learning 
better if subjects realize that choices come from a nonstationary distribution (or 
others are learning too), and therefore give more recent observations more weight. 
In this model, all types are level 1 ( a1 = 1) and f3s = {38• 
3 .  Cournot Dynamics: Cournot best-response dynamics assumes that players guess 
others will repeat their most previous choices-Le. , all types are level 1 (a1 = 1) 
and f31 = 1, f32, . . .  , f3R = 0. 
The log likelihood of observing a sample of N subjects over a total of 10 periods is 
given by: 
N 10 
LL2 = L · L Log(B((xi(s))) 
i=l s=l 
(12) 
Some subtle issues arise in implementing the estimation. The standard method in 
estimating models with R lags is to exclude the first R rounds of data. Since we estimate 
models with R up to 3, this means discarding 30% of the data. Inspired by a referee's 
call to fix initial conditions of the model somehow, we do so by estimating a hypothetical 
' initial winning number' W0. Level 0 learners are assumed to act as if they had observed 
the winning number W0, before making their first round choice. Continuing along the 
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same lines, to estimate the model with R = 3 we estimate hypothetical winning numbers 
W_1 and W-2· This method fixes the initial conditions, uses all the data, and uses the 
same data for different R values so they can be fairly compared. 
Table 4 reports parameter estimates for recall lengths R=l,2 and 3, with spoilers 
included and excluded. Generally R=3 fits best, as indicated by x2 statistics in the 
bottom rows. But the estimates of weights on the winning numbers two and three 
periods back, �2 and �3, are low, so a model which assumes only one period of recall 
would be an adequate approximation for some purposes. 
The estimates of learner-level proportions ai show that in IT games, nearly half the 
players are level 1 learners and the rest are .roughly evenly divided between levels O and 
2. In FT games types are evenly divided between levels 0 and 1 .  All models restricted 
to only one type are strongly rejected in favor of the many-type model.23 
Estimates of the hypothetical initial winning numbers W0 are quite plausible, around 
50 for IT games and 150 for FT games. The estimated standard deviations of level 0 
choices, !J, are reasonable too. 
The estimates of �1 are above one for IT games and below one for FT games24, which 
may seem odd since it implies that level 0 learners are picking numbers that are further 
from equilibrium than the previous winning number. But keep in mind that level 1 
learners choose a fraction p·���l), of their guess about the average level 0 choice. When 
this fraction is multiplied by the typical �1, the product is usually around one or lower (for 
IT games), which captures the idea that level 1 players choose numbers below previous 
winning numbers. If the estimates of �1 were much lower, that would force the level 1 
choices to be 'too small' to fit the data well. 
We also estimated the learning-model parameters separately for each of the eight 
treatment combinations for both IT and FT games. 25 
Parameter estimates are significantly different for different values of p and n, but not 
in an interesting way. Parameter estimates are different for inexperienced and experi­
enced subjects in IT games in a way that is interesting: Experience shifts the level with 
the highest estimated proportion up about one level (e.g., 61 = .572 and 62 = . 159 for 
inexperienced, versus c21 = .290 and c22 = .417 for experienced). At the same time, the 
estimated initial winning numbers are generally further from equilibrium in the experi­
enced groups (Wo = 48.23, versus 40.74 for inexperienced). This interesting combination 
23The x2 statistics are 1916 and 200 (a0 = 1 only), 2464 and 720 (a1 = 1) ,  3283 and 1320 (a2 = 1 ) ,  
and 2430 and 1844 ( a3 = 1) for IT  and FT games respectively. 
24The discrepancy in estimates tJi shows that parameters for IT and FT learning differ (the differing 
ai estimates show this as well), so it can be rejected as a general theory of learning with invariant 
parameters. 
25The eight analyses are not reported for the sake of brevity. In addition, the estimation is not very 
reliable for FT(p, 3) games because the sample size is smaller, and convergence to the equilibrium of 200 
is often so rapid and uniform across subjects that there is little variation to fit (as is evident in Figures 
3e-f).  
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suggests that previous experience in FT games creates a 'negative transfer' to initial 
choices in IT games (shown by higher values of W0) but also creates positive structural 
transfer, evidenced by more high-level learners. These findings also sharpen the result 4 
mentioned in section 4 above, showing how the more powerful learning model analysis 
yields new insight. 
The Cournot, fictitious play, and geometrically declining weight restrictions on f3i are 
all strongly rejected. 26 This is not surprising given the estimates in Table 4, because (31 
is usually far from one (rejecting Cournot) and (32 and {33 are close to zero (rejecting the 
other two theories). 
6. 2 Learning Direction Theory 
Unlike the models above, which assume some players formulate a belief and choose a best 
response given their beliefs, 'belief-free' models posit direct relations between choices and 
observable variables. For example, Nagel (1995) describes a 'learning direction' theory 
and shows how it accounts for many features of her data. We describe this theory 
and test it in some detail because it represents a potentially important part of Nagel's 
contribution, and its performance may give clues about the likely performance of other 
belief-free 'reinforcement' theories (which conceptualize learning as a direct behavioristic 
relationship between previous outcomes and future choices). 
The idea in learning direction theory is that players move in the direction of choices 
which are optimal ex post. Nagel adds the plausible complication that players change by 
not simply raising and lowering their number choices, but by adjusting the ratio of the 
number they chose to the previous winning number (the 'adjustment factor'), lowering 
the ratio if their number was too high and raising the ratio if their number was too low. 
This boils down to the following prediction: 
(13) 
where, as before, Xi (t) denotes predicted choice in period t. Nagel tests learning direction 
theory by frequency cmints of how often the · bounds in (6.7) are violated. We do the 
same, but also reformulate the theory to make it more comparable to the best-response 
models. In the form stated by Nagel, learning direction theory makes a set- theoretic 
prediction. Figure 4 illustrates. Values of w(t - 1) - xi(t - 1 )  are shown on the x-axis 
26For all data including spoilers, using R = 3, the x2 statistics for Cournot, fictitious play, and 
geometric weights are 2678, 2572, and 2512 for IT games, and 1246, 644, and 654 for FT games. 
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d 
x;(t)w(t-2) th · N d' 'd th ' d . an x; (t-l)w(t-l) on e y-axis. ow iv1 e e space mto qua rants around the pomt 
x=O, y=l (i.e. , where w(t - 1) = xi (t - 1) and xi (t) = xi (t - l)w(t - 1)/w(t - 2)) .  
Learning direction theory predicts that if actual values were plotted on Figure 4, most 
of the data would lie in the two shaded quadrants to the right and above of ( O, 1) (numbers 
are too low in t-1, adjust upward in t), and to the left and below of (0, 1) (numbers too 
high, adjust downward). 
Purely to compare this kind of prediction parametrically with the other learning mod­
els, we express the set-theoretic prediction stated by Nagel as a very general response 
function that is continuous and locates data only in the upper right and lower left quad­
rants. Consider the following response function: 
xi (t) 
As "/3 � oo ,  
"/2 1 w(t - 1) ["/1 - 1 + e-'Ya ·(x; (t-1)-w(t-1)) ) . Xi(t - ) • w(t - 2) 
("/1 - 12) · xi(t - 1) · :�: = �� if xi (t - 1) > w(t - 1) 
"/1 · Xi ( t - 1) · W ( t - l) if Xi ( t - 1) < W ( t - 1) w(t - 2) 
(14) 
(15) 
This response function is a variant of a stochastic choice model in which the likelihood of 
choosing A over B, say, varies continuously and nonlinearly with the difference between 
their utilities. In (6 .8) , the ratio x���212 · :t�=�� varies nonlinearly with the difference 
xi (t - 1) - w(t - 1). The free parameters 'Yi specify the location and curvature of the 
function. Keep in mind that this response function is a very specific form of learning 
direction theory (cf. Stahl, in press), different than the form studied by Nagel and 
designed only to make it more comparable to the parameterized iterated best-response 
models. Rejecting it does not imply rejection of the set-theoretic version of the theory. 
The response-function form of learning direction theory can be tested by assuming 
normal errors in responses and choosing parameters to maximize the log likelihood of 
the data xi (t) . · We then: test various restrictions on the parameters 'Yi' which restrict 
the shape of the response function. For example, if 13 is finite the response function is 
continuous- Figure 4 shows an example- and has 'Yl and "/l - 12 as asymptotes in the 
upper and lower quadrants. Furthermore, for the response function to pass through the 
origin (allowing only outcomes in the upper right and lower left quadrants) requires that 
at xi (t - 1) - w(t - 1) = 0, the coefficient in (6.8) is 1, which implies 11 - � = 1. 
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A simpler nonparametric test of learning direction theory is whether players usually 
change their adjustment factors, raising and lowering number choices, in a way that 
depends on previous choices and winning numbers. Table 5a shows transition frequencies 
from three possible conditions on period t - 1 choices- choices are below, equal to, or 
above the winning number- to three conditions for period t choices. (A fourth condition 
for period t - 1 choices, called 'never fail' means that learning direction theory predicts 
a bound which can never be violated. 27) 
Learning direction theory predicts most transitions will lie on the diagonal categories 
(printed in bold). Most transitions do lie in these categories but a substantial fraction of 
observations lie in the wrong cells (37% and 46% in infinite- and finite-threshold games). 
A more complicated test uses maximum-likelihood estimation to estimate the param­
eters 'Yi of the response function (6 .8) ,  and tests whether the restrictions that l�arning 
direction theory imposes are satisfied. Table 5b shows estimates and log likelihoods 
(using data from the second round on). 
Stricter forms of learning direction theory can be characterized as making any of three 
predictions: (a) 71 > 1, 71 - 72 < 1 (i.e., the response function asymptotes in the shaded 
quadrants in Figure 4); (b) 71 - � = 1 (the response function passes through the point 
(0,1) in Figure 4); and (c) 73 = oo (the response function is a step function, discontinuous 
at the point (0,1)). 
Table 5b gives maximum likelihood estimates for 71, 72, 73, and a-, estimated sepa­
rately for FT and IT games. In both games, restriction (a) is not rejected but restrictions 
(b) and ( c) are. These rejections indicate that the response-function form organizes the 
data adequately if the response function simply asymptotes into the predicted quadrants, 
but not if it satisfies the stronger properties of sharp inflection and passing through the 
point (0,1). (The latter rejection means the response function 'crosses into' an unpre­
dicted quadrant, perhaps the strongest evidence against the theory from this analysis.) 
The substantial number of wrong transitions shown in Table 5a also indicate that there 
is room for improvement in the set-theoretic form of the theory as well.28 
Finally, while the response-function form of the learning direction approach and the 
iterated best-response models are not nested, when they are compared using an infor­
mation criterion which penalizes theories for using extra degrees of freedom, the iterated 
best-response theory does substantially better. 29 
27For example , for infinite-threshold games with p < 1 ,  suppose w(t - 1) and w(t - 2) are 30 and 20 
and x(t - 1) is 70., Learning direction theory predicts th!'Lt since x(t - 1) was higher than the previous 
winning number, x(t) must then be less than x(t - l)w(t - 1)/w(t - 2), or 105, which will always be 
satisfied. The category 'never fail' includes all these cases. 
28Nagel and Duffy suggested learning direction theory may work well in the early rounds of an experi­
ment (like the four rounds in their papers) and not as well in the later rounds, which explains the mixed 
performance in our ten-round analysis. 
29The Akaike criterion (AIC), for example, subtracts k(ln(n) + 1) from 2 times the log likelihood, 
where n is sample size and k is the number of free parameters (see, e.g . ,  Hamparsum Bozdogan, 1987). 
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7 Discussion 
7 .1 Rationality-thresholds and iterated dominance 
Standard game theoretic models are indifferent to task complexity since players are as­
sumed to be fully rational. Our results show that choices reveal a limited number of 
steps of iterated dominance (which could be taken as a sharp measure of the degree of 
bounded (mutual) rationality). Since iterated dominance is limited, the minimal number 
of iterated dominance steps needed to solve a dominance-solvable game, which we call 
the rationality-threshold, is correlated with equilibrium convergence and behavior. 
Many previous studies also showed modest levels of iterated dominance. Randolph 
Beard and Richard Beil (1994) studied mutual rationality and found that about 50% 
of the subjects violated it, in a game presented in a . tree form and played sequentially. 
Using a similar game, Andrew Schotter, Weigelt, and Charles Wilson (1994) found that 
half their subjects violated mutual rationality, and about 20% violated weak dominance 
in a matrix-form game. (These percentages were much lower in an extensive-form game.) 
John van Huyck, Daniel Wildenthal, and Raymond Battalio (1994) study a five-strategy 
variant of a prisoners' dilemma in which choices corresponds to levels of iterated domi­
nance, and found about three levels of iterated dominance. Camerer, Barry Blecherman, 
and David Goldstein (1995) studied the 'electronic mail game' introduced by Ariel Ru­
binstein (1988) and observed about two levels of iterated dominance. In McKelvey and 
Palfrey's study (1992) of centipede games, most subjects reveal 2 or 3 levels of iterated 
dominance. 
In a study which essentially created the approach we used, Stahl and Wilson (1995) 
define 'level-0' players as those who choose strategies randomly and equally-often, level-
1 players as those who optimize against lower level (level-0) players, and so forth. In 
three-strategy matrix games, they estimate that most players are level-1 or level-2 but 
the games are not designed to discriminate levels higher than that. 
As we mentioned in the introduction, all these games are nonconstant-sum. In ex­
perimental applications (where dollar payoffs cannot be presumed to map exactly into 
utilities), a test of dominance is a joint test of utility-maximization and the self-interest 
assumption that utility depends only on one's own dollar payoffs. For example, in McK­
elvey & Palfrey's centipede games, 15-20% of the players who arrive at the final node 
violate dominance by 'passing'. Passing means taking 20% of a $32 pie (earning $6.40 
while the other player gets $25.60) instead of 80% of a $16 pie (earning $12.80 while the 
other gets $3.20). 
Players who obey dominance (maximizing utility) but care substantially about others' 
We reestimated the iterated best-response model starting with second round data (excluding W _2 ) to 
make it comparable to learning direction theory. The results yield AICs of -20724 (IT) and -12208 (FT) 
for learning direction and -18259 and -11588 for iterated-best response. (More negative numbers are 
bad.) 
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payoffs30 will violate the conjunction of dominance and self-interest by passing at the 
final node. In addition, a third of the subjects who reach the penultimate, second-to-last 
node, either violate dominance, or believe others will, by passing at' that node. Indeed, 
the centipede game is the rule, not the exception: In all the games mentioned previously 
in this section, subjects who violate the self-interest assumption may appear to violate 
dominance. 
This point is also evident in the large literature on bargaining and public goods games. 
In these games, a large portion of players violate the conjunction of dominance and self­
interest by rejecting low offers, giving money to others, contributing to a public good, 
or cooperating in a prisoner's dilemma (e.g., Camerer and Richard Thaler, 1995 ; David 
Sally, 1995; John Ledyard, 1995). But these results overstate the degree of dominance 
violation if players are simply being fair-minded or altruistic. 
As discussed before, the p-beauty contest game allows us to more neatly separate 
self-interest and iterated dominance.31 Since our game is constant-sum, actions which 
violate iterated dominance are not easily reconciled with models of fairness or altruism.32 
Thus, p-beauty contests are a superior game for isolating degrees of iterated dominance 
from the complications of self-interest violations. 
In the original work on these games, Nagel (1995) used large groups various values of p 
(above and below one), playing for four rounds. For p = 2/3, for example, she reports an 
average initial choice around 36, which correspond to about 2 levels of iterated dominance 
(see also Table 3), or one step of reasoning from a reference point of 50. She also observes 
gradual convergence toward equilibrium. 
John Duffy & Nagel (1995) studied 12-16 person groups with p = 1/2, in which the 
target number was p times the mean, median, or maximum number chosen in a group. 
(All these games have the same equilibrium of zero.) They find no substantial difference 
between mean and median games, and higher choices in the maximum game. 
Our results extend these earlier findings in several ways. We draw a novel distinc-
3°For example, assume a linear additive 'social utility function' in which player i's utility for the 
allocation (xi , Xj) is Xi + axj . Then passing is utility-maximizing iff a > .29. 
31 Another way to separate the two is to collect information-processing measures other than choices. 
For example, Eric Johnson et al (1995) show using measures of attention that players in a three-stage se­
quential bargaining game often do not look past the first stage, violating the computational underpinning 
of iterated dominance. 
32The claim that p-beauty contests are fairness-free depends on the model of fairness being considered. 
In Matthew Rabin�sA (1993)-r-approach,for example, 'niceness' and m.eanness' of actions alter players' 
social utilities away from pure self-interest, then a standard equilibrium concept is applied to the altered 
utilities. In p-beauty contests with sufficiently small stakes, this idea could create fairness equilibria in 
which everybody picks a number, say 50, and shares the prize equally. The equilibrium is supported by 
the fact that a deviation would 'meanly' enhance the deviator's payoff at the expense of others, leading 
to punishments which end at the Nash equilibrium in which the prize is still shared equally so deviation 
doesn't pay. Empirically, these fairness equilibria probably become fragile as the number of subjects 
increases (which may explain the anomalous group size effect we observe) and the small effect of fairness 
may also be squashed by the modest stakes we use. 
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tion between games with finite and infinite rationality-thresholds and show that finite­
threshold games converge more quickly and reliably. 33 Our use of a Stahl-Wilson type 
structural model of levels of reasoning, estimated from first round choices, gives a sharper 
characterization of levels of iterated dominance. Using different group sizes reveals a 
puzzling effect- smaller groups learn slower. Playing different games sequentially shows 
evidence of positive learning transfer. 
7.  2 Learning 
By using ten rounds instead of four (and collecting eight times as much data), we got 
a fuller picture of learning. The extra data enable reliable estimates of learning models. 
The tests of various learning models suggest some stylized facts: 
• Players appear to be influenced by up to three previous winning numbers. 
• The data are consistent with presence of adaptive (level 0) learners who simply 
respond to experience, and sophisticated (level 1 and higher) learners who best­
respond to lower-level learners. Thus, any learning model which hopes to describe 
well should include both types. 
• Familiar learning models which are special cases of our approach, including Cournot 
best-response dynamics (which looks back only one period) and fictitious play, are 
clearly rejected. 
• Restrictions corresponding to a form of the 'learning direction' model Nagel pro­
posed can be rejected. An information-criterion-based comparison of learning di­
rection shows it fits worse than iterated best-response. 
7 . 2 . 1  Payoff reinforcement 
Best-response models of the sort estimated above do not directly alter the probability of 
choosing a strategy according to the strategy's previous payoff. 
An entirely different class of 'payoff reinforcement' models ignore beliefs, and assume 
that the propensity to play strategies depends on a specific initial propensity and on 
how strategies have been 'reinforced' (based on observed success or failure) in the past. 
Reinforcement models of this kind were widely used to study animal behavior, and human 
learning in the neyday 6f 'behaviorism:', until the 1960s or so when they were largely 
abandoned for models with more cognitive detail. 
33Nagel conducted three sessions with p = 4/3 and a number interval [0,100]. First-period data look 
roughly like a reflection of p = 2/3 data around the midpoint of 50, although many choose 33 and 
100. However, with choices in [0, 100] and p > 1 ,  no numbers are ruled out by any level of iterated 
dominance (in contrast to our design). Also , 0 and 100 are both equilibria in her design, though O is not 
trembling-hand perfect, but 200 is the unique equilibrium in ours. 
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Reinforcement models have been applied to many games recently.34 In future re­
search we plan to apply these models to p-beauty contest data. However, there is a 
reason to think reinforcement models will not fit p-beauty contest data well. Winning 
numbers converge toward a boundary-prediction equilibrium over time. Reinforcement 
models assume that a strategy which wins one time gets reinforced, and is likely to be 
chosen again. Then convergence will occur sluggishly because 'old' winning numbers will 
continue to get picked (unless previous reinforcements are very quickly forgotten). The 
basic problem is that it is hard to build endogenously into reinforcement the fact that (as 
post-experiment comments indicate) players realize winning numbers are converging. 35 
Stahl ( 1994) proposes a different model in which decision rules are reinforced rather 
than specific strategies (number choices). Rule learning has some precedence in re­
lated literature (e.g., Richard Dawkins on culturally-transmitted 'memes ) and squarely 
addresses the shortcomings of strategy reinforcement just mentioned. In Stahl's rule­
learning approach, subjects choose one of K decision rules, where decision rule k chooses 
a number equal to pk · w( t - 1) after observing a previous winning number w( t - 1 ) .  Rules 
are reinforced by their expected payoff. Reinforcing rules, rather than specific numbers, 
does reinforce reasoning the 'best' number of steps ahead. Fitting this model to Nagel's 
data, and using several other free parameters, Stahl finds that initial propensities toward 
k between 0-2 are about equal, and in about half the sessions propensities move toward 
k = 2 over four periods. In addition, he rejects a variety of alternative models (some 
nested, some not) including behavior reinforcement, forecasting of changes in the ratios 
of winning numbers, and direction learning. 
Another concern is that strategy-reinforcement theories must posit an initial propen­
sity to choose various strategies. (Initial propensities are usually taken to be random or 
fit to first round play, though in Stahl's rule-learning approach they are estimated, and 
show evidence of heterogeneity.) Evidence of transfer of experience across similar games 
can be interpreted as evidence about how initial propensities change. Analysis from the 
iterated best-response model showed that first-period choices are somewhat affected by 
previous experience. This implies that initial propensities reflect experience in a related 
game. In addition, experienced players converge faster than inexperienced ones (and are 
estimated to use higher levels of iterated best-response). But in reinforcement terms, 
quicker learning means payoffs have more impact, which implies that initial propensities 
are lowered by experience. Together these results indicate that initial propensities are 
34See Roth and Erev (1995) on bargaining games, Erev and Roth (1995) on games with mixed strate­
gies, Amnon Rapoport , Darryl Seale, Erev , and James Sundali (1995) in entry games. 
35 A referee opined that this criticism of reinforcement slays a straw man because, like forecasting price 
levels durinK·inflait-ienary�-imes, subjects. will know enough to focus on the 'deflation rate' of winning 
numbers rather than their levels. We take the point , but it would be even better for reinforcement models 
to generate such a realization naturally rather than building it into the space of what is being reinforced. 
In addition, in p-beauty contests with interior equilibria in (0, 100) it is not clear that it is more sensible 
to forecast inflation or deflation rather than levels (forecasting changes may create overshooting) , so 
which strategies are reinforced becomes an empirical question. A closely related problem is that it is 
hard for reinforced learners to learn to play repeated game strategies like alternation or trigger strategies, 
unless many-trial patterns are reinforced. 
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altered by experience, but at lower overall levels (or equivalently, experienced subjects 
are more responsive to early-period reinforcements). Since this is certainly a complicated 
way to think about the influence of transferred learning, a more cognitively detailed 
approach is surely worth exploring further. 
25 
References 
[lJ Binmore, K., Gale, J. , and Samuelson, L. 'Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum 
Game,' Game and Economic Behavior, 8, 56-90, 1995 . 
(2J Randolph Beard and Richard Beil 'Do People Rely on the Self-interested Maximiza­
tion of Others - An Experimental Test,' Management Science, pp. 252-262, 1994. 
(3J Bozdogan, Hamparsum. 'Model Selection and Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC): 
The General Theory and Its Analytical Extensions,' Psychometrika, 52, 345-370, 
1987. 
[4) Brown, G. 'Iterative Solution of Games by Fictitious Play,' In Activity Analysis of 
Production and Allocation, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1951 .  
[5] Cachon, Gerard and Camerer, Colin F .  'Loss-avoidance and forward induc'tion in 
experimental coordination games,' Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1996, 
1 1 1 ,  165-194. 
[6] Camerer, Colin, Blecherman, Barry, and Goldstein, David. 'Iterated Dominance and 
Learning in 'Electronic Mail Game' Experiments.' California Institute of Technology 
working paper, 1996. 
[7) Camerer, Colin and Richard Thaler. 'Anomalies: Dictators, Ultimatums, and Man­
ners,' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995. 
[8) Cournot, A. Recherches sur les principes mathematiques de la theorie des richesses. 
Translated into English by N. Bacon as Researches in the Mathematical Principles 
of the Theory of Wealth. London: Haffner, 1960. 
[9) Crawford, V. P. 'Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games,' Econometrica, 63, 
103-143. 
[10] Duffy, John and Nagel, Rosemarie. 'On the Robustness of Behavior in Experimental 
Guessing Games,' University of Pittsburgh Working Paper, 1995. 
(11] Erev, Ido and Roth, Alvin. 'On the Need for Low Rationality, Cognitive Game The­
ory: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy 
Equilibria,' University of Pittsburgh Working Paper 1996. 
(12] Friedman, M. Essays of Positive Economics. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1953. 
[13] Frydman, R. 'Towards an Understanding of Market Processes: Individual Expecta­
tions, Learning, and Convergence to Rational Expectations Equilibrium,' American 
Economic Review, 72, 652-668. 
[14] Garvin, Susan and Kagel, John. 'Learning in Common Value Auctions: Some Initial 
Observations,' Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 25, 1994, 351-
372. 
26 
(15] Gilboa, Itzhak. 'The Complexity of Computing Best-Response Automata in Re­
peated Games,' Journal of Economic Theory, 45, 342-352 . 
[16] Holt, Debra. 'An empirical model of strategic choice with an application to coordi­
nation games,' Department of Economics, Queen's University, 1993. 
(17] Ho, Teck-Hua and Weigelt, Keith. 'Task Complexity, Equilibrium Selection, and 
Learning: An Experimental Study,' Management Science, 42, 659-679. 
[18] Johnson, Eric, Camerer, Colin, Talia Rymon and Sankar Sen. 'Limited Computa­
tion and Fairness in Sequential Bargaining Experiments,' University of Pennsylvania 
Working paper, 1996. 
[19] Jordan, James. 'Bayesian Learning in Normal Form Games,' Games and Economic 
Behavior, 3, 60-81 . 
[20] Keynes, John Maynard 'The General Theory of Interest, Employment and Money, '  
London: Macmillan, 1936. 
[21] Kreps, David. Game Theory and Economic Modelling, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990. 
[22] Ledyard, John. 'Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research,' in J. Kagel 
& A. E. Roth (Eds. ), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995 , pp. 1 11-194. 
[23] LiCalzi, Marco. 'Fictitious Play by Cases,' Games and Economic Behavior, 11, 64-89, 
Oct 1995 
(24] Lovallo, Dan and Camerer, Colin F. 'Overconfidence and excess business entry: An 
experimental approach, California Institute of Technology working paper, 1996. 
[25] McKelvey, Richard D.  and Palfrey, Thomas R. 'An Experimental Study of the Cen­
tipede Game,' Econometrica, 1992, 60, 803-836. 
[26] McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. 'An Experimental Study of the Cen­
tipede Game,' Econometrica, 1992, 60, 803-836. 
[27] McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. 'Quantal response equilibria for nor­
mal form games,' Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 10, 6-38. 
[28] McKelvey, Richard D. and Palfrey, Thomas R. 'Quantal response equilibria for ex­
tensive form games,' C altech WO�king paper 1996. 
[29] Myerson, Roger. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Boston: Harvard University 
Press, 1992. 
[30] Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, John. 'Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning in Normal 
Form Games,' Games and Economic Behavior, 3(1)  February 1991 . 
27 
[31] Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, John. 'Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in 
Games with Strategic Complementarities,' Econometrica, 58(6) : Nov 1990, 1255-
1277. 
[32] Moulin, Herve. Game Theory for the Social Sciences, New York University Press, 
New York, 1986. 
[33] Nagel, Rosemarie. 'Reasoning and learning in guessing games and ultimatum games 
with incomplete information: An experimental investigation, Doctoral dissertation, 
Universitat Bonn, 1994. 
[34] Nagel, R. 'Experimental Results on Interactive Competitive Guessing,' American 
Economic Review, 1995, 85, 1313-1326. 
[35] Porter, David and Smith Vernon L. 'Futures Contracting and Dividend Uncertainty 
in Experimental Asset Markets,' Journal of Business, 68, 509-542, October 1995. 
[36] Rabin, Matthew. 'Modelling fairness in game theory and economics,' American Eco­
nomic Review, 83, December 1993, 1281-1302. 
[37] Rapoport, A . ,  Seale, D. , Erev, R. and Sundali, J. 'Coordination Success in Market 
Entry Games: Tests of Equilibrium and Adaptive Learning Models, ' Management 
Science, in press. 
[38] Roth, Alvin and Erev, Ido. 'Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data 
and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term,' Games and Economic Be­
havior, 8,  164-212  ( 1995) . 
[39] Rubinstein, Ariel. 'The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under 'Almost 
Common Knowledge" American Economic Review, 79 (1989) , 395-391 .  
[40] Sally, David. 'Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: Experimental 
Evidence from 1958 to 1992 , '  Rationality and Society, 1994. 
[41] Schotter, Andrew;  Weigelt, Keith; and Charles Wilson. 'A laboratory investigation 
of multi-person rationality and presentation effects', Games and Economic Behavior, 
1994, 6, 445-468. 
[42] Selten R. and Stoecker R. 'End Behavior in Sequences of Finitely Repeated Pris­
oner's Dilemma Supergames - A Learning Theory Approach,' Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, 7, 47-70. 
[43] Singley, MarkX;,And John R. Anderson. ·The .Transfer of Cognitive Skill. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1989. 
[44) Stahl, Dale. 'The evolution of smartn players,' Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 
1993, 604-617. 
[45] Stahl, Dale. 'Rule Learning in a Guessing Game,' Games and Economic Behavior, 
forthcoming. 
28 
[46] Stahl, Dale and Wilson, Paul. 'Experimental evidence of Players' Models of Other 
Players,' Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1994. 
[47] Stahl, Dale and Wilson, Paul. 'On Players Models of Other Players: Theory and 
Experimental Evidence,' Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 218-254, July 1995 . 
[48] van Huyck, J .  Wildenthal, J .  and Battalio, R. 'Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Un­
certainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable 
Games,' 1994. 
29 
APPENDIX 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in decision-making. Several research foundations have provided 
funds for these experiments. If you follow the instructions, and make good decisions, you 
may earn a sizable amount of money. The amount of money you earn depends on your 
choices and the choices of other subjects in the experiment. 
YOUR DECISION PROBLEM 
The experiment will last for 10 rounds. During each round, you will be presented with 
an identical choice problem. There are n subjects in a group and each of you will simul­
taneously choose a number between 100 to 200 inclusive. Since each of you has worked 
in privacy, after making your choice, an administrator will come around and record your 
number. Your payoff will be determined as follows. Let Xi be person i's number. First 
the average number x will be computed as follows: 
The person whose number is the nearest to 1 . 1  · x receives $3.5 and the rest of you 
receive nothing. If there are identical numbers which are equally close to 1 . 1  · x ,  then 
the $3.5 prize will be equally divided among the persons who chose these numbers. The 
administrator will publicly announce l . lx and come around and privately inform you 
whether you win or not. 
PAYOFFS 
Your dollar earnings for the experiment are the sum of your dollar earnings in every 
round of the game. 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Your Number 
x 
Ll · x  
Payoff 
30 
Group Size 
3 7 
Q) ....... ..... c ti:: c ...... 
FT( l .3 ,3) - -> IT(0.7,3) FT(l .3,7) - -> IT(0.7,7) 
(7 groups) (7 groups) 
OJ) /\ = I I · - I E Q) ....... c:$ . .... 0 c ..... ...:l � 
FT( l . 1 ,3)  --> IT(0.9,3) FT(l . 1 ,7) --> IT(0.9,7) 
(7 groups) (7 groups) 
4-i 0 Q) ....... I-; . .... 
<-S c . .... cr.i � = /\ 
� I I 
IT(0.7,3) --> FT(l .3,3) IT(0.7,7) --> FT( l .3 ,7) 
(7 groups) (7 groups) 
� Q) ....... . .... c ti:: c 
IT(0.9,3) --> FT( l . 1 ,3)  IT(0.9,7) --> FT(l . 1 ,7) 
(6 groups) (7 groups) 
...... 
Table 1 :  The Experimental Design 
Table 2: Frequencies of Levels of Iterated Dominance Over Round in FT and IT games With Varying P Values 
Games/Round ! i  1 i 2 I 3 4 5 6 I 7 8 9 1 0  Total 
i 
FT( 1 . 3 , n) I :  I ! 
R(O) 35 I 9 I 1 2  1 5  9 
R(1 ) i ; 6 8  1 3 4 : 1 2  6 7 
R(2) i l  34 i 6 7  I 4 4  2 6  2 7  
': 5 
! 5 
I 2 2  
1 f I 3 
7 ! 3 
1 1  : 1 1  
4 7 1 1 0  
4 ' 0 1 46 
3 4 2 4 9  
Equilibrium Play , .  3 i 30 ! 72  9 3  9 7  I 1 08 1 1 1  1 23 1 29 1 2 9 8 9 5  
i I I 
I 
FT( 1 . 1 ,n )  i ! I ' ' 
R(O) I I 1 0 2 4 
R(1 ) I 8 1 2 
R(2) !; 1 0 4 2 
R(3) Ii 1 5 I 1 2  4 
R(4) ii 5 4  ! 4 2  1 8  
R(5) 2 3  : 42 4 1  
R(6)-R ( 1 on 1 4  I 2 8  I 4 2  
5 
0 
2 
3 
6 
1 8  
6 1  
2 
2 
1 
3 
9 
6 4  
I 8 
: 2 
: 1 
: 2 
! 0 
I 4 
5 4  
2 5 
2 0 
0 
1 3 
4 2 
5 I 2 
4 0  I 3 6  
8 
' 
5 , I 5 1  
2 2 0  
0 2 2  
4 5  
3 1 3 1 
6 I 5 1 55 
3 9  : 3 3  4 1 1 
Equilibrium Play 1, 3 ! 6 2 4 4 2  5 5  ; 6 6  8 2  ; 8 9  7 9  I 8 9  : 5 3 5  
IT(0 .7 ,n) 
\! 
I 
R(O) j l  3 7  5 6 
R(1 ) ! 3 9  I, 2 6  1 3  
I 
5 7 : 6 6 I 1 o i 7 8 9 7  
8 2 I 3 5 2 \ 2 1 1 0 1 
R(2) i i  1 5  3 8  1 8  1 2  1 1  I 3 3 I 5 I 7 5 1 1 7  
R(3) i l  1 2  I 2 3  I 3 0  2 3  1 7  ; 2 0  1 4  l 7 I 8 1 3  1 67 
R(4) i 1 3  ' 2 6  i 28 2 2  2 2  I 2 2  2 6  2 1  ! 2 5  1 6  i 2 2 1  
R(5) i i  4 9 24 1 9 1 6 I 1 9 1 9  I 1 7 I 1 5 1 7  ! 1 5 9 
R(6)-R ( 1 0) 1 ' 1 5  I 1 0  i 2 1  5 0  6 1  4 7  4 5  I 5 7  I 5 1  4 0  i 3 9 7  
> R(1 1 )  Ii 2 0 0 1 2 I 1 0 1 1  I 7 I 9 1 6 : 5 8 
Equilibrium Play i :  3 ! 3 1 0 0 2 ' 1 0 1 1 1  I 1 4  I 1 6  2 4  i 8 3  
I I  I ' I I I 
i-- -----1i-I --+-- ---t--------,-1 ___ i,-----+-----r---- ---il ---+--- I _ _ -1 
IT(0 . 9 ,n )  1 '1 
R(O) I 
R(1 ) 
R(2) :i 
R(3) i !  
R (4) I 
R(5) j :  
R(6)-R ( 1 0) 
> R(1 1 )  
Equilibrium Play : 
9 3 
7 0 
1 7  ' 6 
9 8 
1 4  I 1 9  
5 9 
'4 6 ! 7 1  
2 7  I 2 0  
3 I 1 
--------r---1---f----+----+--- - . --------i 
2 : i 3 4 3 2 8  
0 0 0 0 1 1  
3 I 2 0 3 3  
8 I 4 I 0 0 0 3 2  
8 : 1 0 6 I 4 3 2 2 1 6 9  
1 5  . 6 6 6 5 2 5 6  ' ' 6 9  7 3  ! 6 1  3 9  4 4  3 6  3 0  3 0  4 9 9  
2 9  4 0  ' 5 9  7 7  7 7  8 5  8 6  8 9  5 8 9  
2 1 : 1 6 6 1 1  ' 1 1  5 3  
Table 3 :  MLEs and Log-likelihoods for Levels of Iterated Dominance (first round data only) 
Game I Our Data (Groups of 3 or 7) I Nagel's Data (Groups of 1 6- 1 8) 
parameter estimates ' Spoilers Included I Spoilers Excluded I p =  112 I p = 2/3 
IT(p,n) 
mo 1 8.05 1 5.93 15 .83 (23 .94) 28.36 ( 1 3. 1 1 ) 
(l)J 20.22 20.74 37.50 (29.58) 34.33 ( 44.26) 
(1)2 1 3 .00 1 3.33 46.67 (40.84) 37.3 1 (39.34) 
(1)3 48.74 50.00 0.00 (5.63) 0.00 ( 3 .28) 
µ 70.00 68.87 36.97 (50.00) 52.23 (50.00) 
(j 27.7 1 27.04 22. 1 2  14.69 
p LOO LOO 0.25 LOO 
-LL 1 143 . 15 1 128.98 1 56.9 244.0 
Ff (p,n) 
mo 24.55 2 1 .72 
(l)J 30.32 3 L46 
(1)2 1 2.27 12.73 
(1)3 32.85 34.08 
µ 1 16.36 1 17.72 
(j 13 .81  1 3.52 
p LOO LOO 
-LL I 1 139.34 I 1 1 17.02 
Table 4: MLEs and Log-likelihoods for the Iterated Best Response Learning Models 
Game Spoilers Included (N=2770) Spoilers Excluded (N=27 1 1 (infinite-threshold); 2666(finite-threshold)) 
parameter estimates Recall Period Recall Period 
R= I R=2 R=3 R=1 R=2 R=3 
IT(p,n) 
a.a 0. 1 905 0.2 1 1 2  0.2 1 02 0.3204 0.3201 0.3 1 73 
a.i 0.4452 0.4398 0.4394 0.5 1 00 0.4977 0.4907 
a.2 0.2977 0.2892 0.2872 0. 1 696 0. 1 52 1  0. 1 604 
a.3 0.0666 0.0597 0.0633 0.0000 0.0302 0.03 1 6  
13-1 1 .25 1 .40 1 .36 1 . 1 7  1 .27 1 .26 
13-2 - -0. 1 4  0.02 - -0.09 0.06 
13-3 - - -0. 1 2  - - -0. 1 3  
Wo 53.03 4 1 .58 42. 1 2  44.04 40.62 38.83 
W-1 - 0.00 35.69 - 0.06 43.89 
w.2 - - 0.00 - - 0.99 
er 3 1 .84 30.35 3 1 . 84 1 9.66 1 9.43 1 9.48 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LL - 10507.9 - 1 0499.8 - 1 0493.3 -1 0008.9 -9990. 1 -998 1 . 1  
x 2  1 6.2 13.0 37.6 1 8.0 
FI(p,n) 
a.o 0.3324 0.4233 0.41 84 0.5649 0.5957 0.5267 
a.i 0.2729 0.5767 0.5 8 1 6  0.435 1 0.4043 0.4733 
a.2 0.3947 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
a.3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
13-1 0.82 0.63 0.61 0.91 0.71 0.69 
13-2 - 0.27 -0.01 - 0.22 O.Ql 
13-3 - - -0.32 - - 0.23 
. 
Wo 1 5 1 .92 1 37.66 1 63.09 1 52.62 1 65.44 1 68.78 
W.1 - 155.00 135.23 - 1 07.93 1 59.67 
w.2 - - 1 00.00 - - 1 00.00 
er 47.0 1 45. 1 6  3 1 .84 27.58 27.09 26.60 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LL -7 1 26.2 -7092.5 -7078.9 -641 3.62 -6395.4 -6380.8 
x 2 67.4 27.4 35.4 29.2 
Table 5a: Frequencies of Number Changes 
Game Choice in t 
Choice in t- 1 x(t) > x(t- 1 )  w(t- 1 )/w(t-2) x(t) = x(t- 1 )  w(t- 1 )/w(t-2) x(t) < x(t- 1 )  w(t- 1 )/w(t-2) 
Total 
IT(p, n) 
x(t- 1 )  < w(t- 1 )  926 4 5 1 4 1444 
x(t- 1 )  = w(t- 1 )  2 10 5 1 7 
x(t- 1 )  > w(t- 1 )  206 54 431 69 1 
Never Fail 64 0 0 64 
Total 1 1 98 68 950 22 1 6 
FT(p, n) 
x(t- 1 )  < w(t- 1 )  27 0 69 96 
x(t- 1 )  = w(t- 1 )  0 0 0 0 
x(t- 1 )  > w(t- 1 )  224 238 598 1 060 
Never Fail 996 0 64 1 060 
Total 1449 238 73 1 22 1 6  
Note: Bold indicates transitions predicted by learning direction theory 
Table 5b: MLEs and Log-likelihoods for the Learning Direction Theory 
Game 
restrictions y1 
Y2 "(3 Wo (J -LL 
IT(p, n) 
2.23 No restrictions 2.34 0.03 45.30 19.53 10340.7 
y1 > 1 ; y1 - Y2 < 1 2.23 2.34 0.03 45.30 19.53 10340.7 
y1 - yi/2 = 1  2. 1 3  2.26 0.03 43.22 19.58 10346.3 
"(3 = infinity 1 .07 1 .05 infinity 4 1 .28 32.58 1 1499.3 
All three restrictions 1 .74 0.48 infinity 5 1 .23 30.62 1 2063.7 
FT(p, n) 
No restrictions 2.68 3 .26 0.003 1 80.69 54.94 608 1 .8 
y1 > 1 ;  y1 - Y2 < 1 2.68 3 .26 0.003 1 80.69 54.94 608 1 .8 
y1 - yi/2 = 1 3 .34 4.68 0.004 1 68.76 55.83 6097.7 
"(3 = infinity 1 . 17 0.09 infinity 1 85.47 56.65 61 38.5 
All three restrictions 1 . 15 0.30 infinity 178.63 56. 10  6 173.9 
Attraction of Equilibrium Point 
R(O) R( l) 
130 169 100 
R(2) 
Equilibrium 
Point 
! 
I 200 
Figure l a: A Finite-Threshold Game, Ff(n) = ([100,200], 1 .3 , n) 
Equilibrium 
Point 
! 1· . rr(S1R(41 R(3) i 
8 12 17 24 34 0 
Attraction of Equilibrium Point 
R(2) R( l )  R(O) 
49 70 
Figure lb: An Infinite-Level Threshold Game, IT(n) = ([0, 100], 0.7, n) 
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Figure 4: Learning Direction Theory Predictions 
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